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The Civil Rights President and the MFDP Dispute: Did Lyndon Johnson Betray the 
Civil Rights Movement? 
Lyndon B. Johnson is heralded as the Civil Rights President. This title is 
deserved considering that during his term he is credited with the passage of such bills as 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. There is, however, a 
troublesome paradox in the civil rights legacy of this President. This paradox surrounds 
Johnson's handling of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's (MFDP) appeal to 
replace the racist Mississippi Democratic delegation at the Democratic National 
Convention of 1964. During this controversy, Johnson worked furiously behind the 
scenes to make sure that the MFDP did not get seated at the convention. Johnson felt his 
election was the best bet African Americans had for advancing their platform and he 
perceived the MFDP challenge as a threat to his election chances. His work behind the 
scenes was an effort to secure the election and to give civil rights four years of executive, 
legislative, and judicial privilege in Washington. In protecting his long term goal of a 
Great Society, however, Johnson betrayed the ideals of justice, equality, and democracy 
that his goal intended to protect. 
There was no place in America where Johnson's vision for a Great Society was 
farther away than in Mississippi. Mississippi's entire society was constructed to keep the 
black population dependant to the white population. What rights blacks had won in the 
Civil War were reduced to memories when Reconstruction canle to an end. When the 
state rewrote its Constitution after Reconstruction, disenfranchisement of the black 
population was at its very core. l The white establishment knew that political exclusion 
1 John Dittmer. Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi. (Chicago: University of Illinois. 
Press, 1994), p. 13. 
2 
was the key to getting African-Americans 'back in their place.' From there, blacks were 
reduced from active participants in the political and economic spheres of society to a 
status that was little better than slaves. As the twentieth century progressed in years, 
white Mississippi rebuilt the caste system that left it with near absolute authority over the 
state's black population. As one white landowner told the black family he had just 
evicted, "Your food, your work and your very lives depend on good-heartened [sic] white 
people.,,2 
The "good-heartened white people" of Mississippi had thrust the black population 
into deplorable poverty. In 1960,the mean annual income for a black family in 
Mississippi was $1,444, which was the lowest in the nation? The system of labor that 
dominated the Mississippi landscape greatly contributed to the poverty of the people. 
Most people were domestic laborers, sharecroppers, or independent farmers struggling to 
survive. Sharecroppers often got caught in a vicious cycle landowners used to keep the 
them in debt. The cycle consisted of lending the sharecroppers money to plant, and 
paying only a fraction of the market price for the crops grown. There was little hope of 
escaping this cycle. A few did, but they were often the victims of violence. Reverend 
Isaac Simmons was one such victim. Reverend Simmons owned 220 acres of debt free 
land near the town of Liberty, Mississippi. In 1944, rumors that oil was discovered on 
his land prompted local whites to ask for his land, but he refused to give it up. A man 
named Noble Ryder shot Reverend Simmons three times and cut his tongue out in front 
of the Reverend's son, Eldridge. Eldridge reluctantly gave up the land, and he filed 
2 Charles M. Payne. I've Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom 
Struggle. (Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1995), p.2. 
3 Doug McAdam. Freedom Summer. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.25. 
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charges against Ryder and his accomplices in an effort to obtain justice. The men 
involved in the killing were promptly acquitted.4 
In addition to the labor system employed to keep black Mississippians 
subservient, the educational system helped ensure they would remain so. It was designed 
to keep field workers available during planting and picking seasons, which meant that 
African-American youths did not go to school from March until November. Also, when 
they did go to school, the conditions were deplorable. In 1964, Mississippi spent $81.86 
a year on a white student and only $21.77 a year on a black student. It is important to 
note that that is the average amount per student. In extreme cases, such as the town of 
Holly Hill, white students received $191.70 and black students received $1.26.5 
Mississippi kept black students poor and ignorant as well as dependent. 
As if this was not a sufficient check on the threat blacks posed to the status quo, 
white Mississippi hemmed them in politically. The most important step in this process 
was to take away their vote. In 1955, there were only 12,000 blacks registered to vote in 
the entire state.6 Various tactics were employed to prevent registration and also to 
remove those already on the roles. The poll tax and grandfather clauses managed to keep 
many away, but for those who attempted to register, there was the literacy test. Most of 
Mississippi's blacks were, at best, semi-literate, so this obstacle was formidab1e. 7 The 
applicant was not only required to read, but also interpret one section of Mississippi's 
4Dittmer, p. 15. 
5 McAdam, p.25. 
6 Dittmer, p.70. 
7 Payne, p.115. 
4 
constitution. 8 Since it was the responsibility of the registrar to determine if the applicant 
had given an appropriate response, very few blacks met the requirements. 
If the institutional obstacles were not enough to keep someone from attempting to 
step outside the caste system, there were always threats of violent reprisals. In 1946, 
Mississippi Senator Theodore Bilbo made preventing the black vote the major issue in his 
successful bid for reelection. When urging crowds to prevent blacks from voting he 
would say "you and I know what's the best way to keep the nigger from voting. You do 
it the night before the election. I don't have to tell you any more than that. Red-blooded 
men know what I mean.,,9 Unfortunately, the crowd knew and had known for some time 
what the senator meant. Between 1880 and 1940 almost six hundred blacks were lynched 
in Mississippi alone. tO Ten others were lynched between 1956 and 1959.11 It was also 
known that there was no redress for these crimes. Any white person accused of killing a 
black person in Mississippi would walk. The local police often cooperated with Ku Klux 
Klan, and the judges were rarely sympathetic to victims of these crimes. 12 What 
happened in the case of Reverend Simmons would happen every time. 
In addition to threats of violence, there were the threats of economic and legal 
retribution. If someone attempted to register to vote, the individual's name was printed in 
the newspaper. Those who escaped violent attacks were likely to lose their jobs, be 
evicted or both. 13 Also, those who stepped 'out of line' could expect to be arrested and 
fined for senseless charges and traffic offenses such as not yielding far enough in advance 
8 Dittmer, p. 71. 
9 Ibid. p.2. 
10 Ibid. p.13. 
11 Ibid. p.79. 
12 Mary King. Freedom Song: A Personal Story o/the 1960s Civil Rights Movement. (New York: William 
Morrow, 1987), p. 52. 
13 Kay Mills. This Little Light o/Mine: The Life o/Fannie Lou Hamer. (New York: Dutton, 1993), p.48. 
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of a tum. The circumstances in Mississippi left the people with a "debilitating fatalism" 
and with little hope of improving their situation. 14 
This situation began to change, though, when the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SN CC) began voter registration programs in 1961. As Fannie 
Lou Hamer put it, "They brought every hope into the state of Mississippi." 15 There was 
finally an organization that told the poor sharecroppers and domestic laborers that they 
could vote and participate in society, and it was there to teach them how. 
The catalyst for the hope that came to Mississippi was a young Harvard 
philosophy student named Robert Paris Moses. He came to the state in 1961 to work on 
voter registration. Moses began his civil rights work in Atlanta stuffing envelopes for the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). His stay, however, was brief as he 
left at the urging of fellow SCLC staffers Ella Baker and Jane Stembridge to battle 
disenfranchisement in the Deep South with SNCC. 16 Moses and the SNCC staff spent 
two years of wearisome work trying to educate and register voters with little real success. 
In 1963 they decided to hold a mock election during the regular state election to 
showcase the potential power of the black electorate. Enduring violent reprisals from 
white Mississippi, over 83,000 people cast their "Freedom Votes" to elect NAACP staff 
member Aaron Henry governor, and white SNCC staffmenlber Ed King to Lieutenant 
Governor. 17 The Freedom Vote in 1963 laid the foundation for the events of the 
following summer. 
14 McAdam, p.28. 
15 Mills p.4l. 
16 Clayborne Carson. In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), p. 26. 
17 Dittmer, p. 200-5. 
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The summer of 1964, or Freedom Summer as it came to be known, focused on 
forcing a showdown between the federal government and Mississippi. SNCC wanted to 
compel the Justice Department and the FBI to become actively involved in protecting the 
rights of United States citizens living in Mississippi. 18 To do this, Moses proposed 
bringing one thousand white students from prestigious universities and families into 
Mississippi to help with voter registration efforts and to teach in "Freedom Schools.,,19 
He hoped their presence would bring about the desired confrontation between the federal 
government and the Mississippi authorities. SNCC president John Lewis hoped that "out 
of this conflict, this division, this chaos, will come something positive.,,2o 
SNCC and those involved in Freedom Summer soon learned that any positive 
results that would come out of Freedom Summer would come at enormous costs. On 
June 22, 1964, as a group of volunteers preparing for Mississippi were being trained in 
Oxford, Ohio, news came that three project workers were missing from the night before. 
Andrew Goodman, a white volunteer from New York, James Chaney, a local black 
project worker, and Michael Schwemer, a white SNCC staff member, went to 
Philadelphia, Mississippi to check on the status of the Neshoba County project. When 
they failed to report in that night, SN CC veteran staff feared the worst. The three 
workers had been arrested for a minor traffic violation in Philadelphia, and were released 
later that evening. Shortly after being released from jail that evening, they were abducted 
by the KKK. They were beaten, shot, and buried in an earthen dam somewhere in remote 
Neshoba County?1 
18 Carson, p.96. 
19Ibid p.98. 
20 Ibid p.99. 
21 Dittmer, p.246-7. 
7 
The fate of the three workers was not known until August 4 of the same 
summer.22 Their disappearance, though, brought the media's spotlight onto the summer 
project and inequalities present in Mississippi. The extremely negative press was 
embarrassing to both the state and the nation. It was this bad press that forced the state 
and federal authorities to act. The state, as expected, was reluctant to act. Initially, the 
state accused SNCC of staging the workers' disappearance as a publicity stunt?3 This 
was a typical response to reports of violence against civil rights activists. Activists were 
often accused of and charged with shooting into their own homes or bombing their own 
buildings. The governor also responded with indifference. Rita Schwerner, the wife of 
Michael Schwerner, tried to speak to the governor on two different occasions. The first 
was in the executive office, but when she asked to see him, the doors to his office were 
hurriedly shut and the governor conveniently disappeared. She later tried to speak with 
him at his residence. As Governor Paul Johnson approached, in the company of Alabama 
governor George Wallace, Rita stepped forward with Reverend Ed King and Bob Zellner. 
The Governor extended his hand to greet Zellner, but quickly pulled it away when he 
recognized Rita. The two governors hurried inside and the doors were locked. State 
troopers standing guard refused to even deliver a hand-written note. 24 
What the state did was allow the FBI to investigate without interference. The 
attention surrounding the disappearance of the three workers compelled President 
Johnson to order the FBI to infiltrate the Klan and bring the murderers to justice, which 
22 Ibid p.283. 
23Michael R. Beschloss, ed. Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964 (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1997) p.432. LBJ's conversation with Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland on 
Tuesday, June 23, 1964. 
24 King, p. 390-1. 
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they did.25 The President and the Justice Department had previously maintained that 
protection of civil rights workers was not the jurisdiction of the FBI. In other cases of 
violence against civil rights activists, the FBI literally sat back and took notes as people 
were beaten and arrested. President Johnson made them take action, though, in the case 
of Goodman, Chaney, and Schwerner, and later in the summer he would do the same to 
serve his own needs. 
The white volunteers brought the needed attention to the state, but they did not 
help improve the state's registration record. During the summer of 1964, over 17,000 
blacks attempted to register to vote in the state Democratic Party, but only 1,600 were 
successful. 26 Mississippi had a long history of denying blacks the vote and justice, and 
the state did not seem deterred by increasing federal intervention. The prospect of 
bringing social changes to the state by using the state Democratic Party was hopeless. 
SNCC and the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) turned to the MFDP to try to 
bring about the desired changes in Mississippi and across the nation. 
The MFDP took root on April 26, 1964, in Jackson, Mississippi.27 This 
predominantly black political party was closely associated with SNCC and COFO in 
attempting to mobilize the black population in Mississippi during the summer of 1964. 
The founders of the MFDP hoped that the party would become an alternative to the 
regular Democratic Party which showed no sign of embracing the African-American or 
his agenda. The white volunteers and the SNCC staff poured their time and energy into 
registering people into the Mississippi Freedon1 Democratic Party, and through voter 
25 Beschloss, p.425. LBJ's conversation with Lee White, Associate Counsel to the President, on Tuesday, 
June 23, 1964. 
26 Carson, p.ll? 
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registration campaigns across the state, COFO and SNCC funneled around forty thousand 
African-Americans into the MFDP. 28 
The leadership of SNCC felt the MFDP was a tool that could be used to gain 
leverage within the political "structure" of America in order to gain accommodations for 
African Americans within the structure?9 Also, through the MFDP, SNCC hoped to 
realign the Democratic Party and its liberals to build a political coalition of whites and 
blacks.30 This coalition would build a political power that would strive to liberate both 
blacks and poor whites through political "aggitations," [sic] such as voter registration and 
education campaigns.31 The most ambitious of the MFDP's agitations was its plan to 
send a delegation to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City to challenge 
the seating of the lily-white delegation chosen by the state Denl0cratic Party. 32 The 
MFDP produced the desired results. 
In selecting the delegates to represent the MFDP in Atlantic City, the rules of the 
National Democratic Party were followed precisely. The MFDP precinct and county 
elections were often held at locations where the state party had announced the delegate 
selections would take place. It was common for the state party to move the locations and 
cancel the meetings to prevent blacks from attempting to participate. The selection of the 
delegates and alternates started with precinct elections, then county, and culnlinated at the 
27 Interview with Fannie Lou Hamer, 2 September 1967. Emily Stoper, The Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee: The Growth of Radicalism in a Civil Rights Organization (1968; rpt. Brooklyn: 
Carlson, 1989), p. 306. 
28William L. O'Neill, Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the 1960's (New York: Times 
Books, 1971), p. 166. 
29Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) Papers, 1959-1972 (U.M.I.) vol. 2, Staff Meeting 
Minutes; June 9, 1964, p.5. 
30 Ibid. p.4. 
31 Ibid. p.5. 
32 Alexander Bloom and Wini Breines, eds., Takin' It to the Streets: A Sixties Reader (New York: Oxford, 
1995) p.34. 
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state MFDP convention in Jackson. It was in Jackson where sixty-two delegates and 
alternates were elected to go to New Jersey for the Democratic National Convention. 
The election of the delegates did far more than simply choose who would get to go to 
Atlantic City. It was also a process that politicized a segment of the population that had 
not been allowed to participate in even the most basic of political freedoms. The farmers 
and domestic laborers who risked their very lives to try to vote learned how the political 
process worked. They became educated and empowered by their new knowledge. They 
took ownership in what they were trying to accomplish and embraced the ideals of 
equality, justice, and democracy, that for the first time, seemed within reach. 
The white population also sensed the significance of what the MFDP was doing, 
and they reacted with the weapons that had worked for years: violence and the threat of 
violence. Municipalities across the state prepared for war. The mayor of Jackson, Allen 
Thompson, budgeted $2.2 million dollars for the build-up of the city's police force. 
Among other things, he bought 200 new shotguns, added 60 more riot-trained police to 
his task force of390, and prepared a detention center capable of holding 25,000 people. 
His most famous item was a "13,OOO-pound battlewagon" nicknamed Thompson's 
Tank?3 Thompson told Newsweek magazine that his city was "going to be ready for 
them ... They won't have a chance.,,34 Those involved in Freedom Summer also 
experienced escalated violence fronl vigilante groups such as the Klan. During the 
summer of 1964 alone, there were four project workers killed, four workers critically 
wounded, eighty workers beaten, one thousand arrested, thirty-seven churches bombed or 
33 McAdam, p.2S. 
34 Ibid p.2S. 
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burned, and thirty black homes or businesses bombed or burned.35 The political 
exclusion and violence that continued throughout the summer failed to have the desired 
effect. Instead of deterring local blacks from becoming involved, it strengthened their 
resolve. Sensing the opportunity for justice, the MFDP, convinced of its righteousness, 
traveled to Atlantic City. 
The battle over the seating was to be fought in the Convention Credentials 
Committee. The MFDP hired a longtime Democratic insider and president of the 
influential Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), Joseph Rauh, as their counsel. The 
leaders of the MFDP and Joseph Rauh anticipated a fierce battle with the Convention 
Credentials Committee over the seating issue and set forth moral, legal, and political 
reasons why the MFDP should replace the all-white delegation at the Convention. Those 
who testified on behalf of the MFDP were Aaron Henry, Ed King, Fannie Lou Hamer, 
Rita Schwerner, the NAACP's Roy Wilkins, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.36 The moral 
reasoning hinged on the testimonies of Mrs. Hamer and Mrs. Rita Schwerner. Mrs. 
Hamer told the Credentials Committee of her expulsion from her home for attempting to 
register to vote, her arrest, and her beating from black inmates upon the orders of the 
white officers.37 She told the committee and a national audience that she received all of 
this persecution because she wanted to be a "first-class citizen" and live as a "decent 
human being in America.,,38 Mrs. Schwerner, the widow of Michael Schwerner, also hit 
an emotional nerve in the nation when she told of the total disregard Mississippi 
Governor Paul Johnson had for her loss and recalled his efforts to avoid speaking with 
35 Ibid p. 96. 
36 Ibid p.117-121. 
37 "Remarks of Mrs. Fanny Lou Hamer," Bloom and Breines, p. 41-2. 
38 Ibid p. 42-3. 
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her. She also condemned the governor and the state for their unwillingness to investigate 
her husband's disappearance. 39 
The legal arguments rested on the white delegation's refusal to confonn to the 
party's national regulation requiring "openness to membership without ethnic or racial 
banners.,,4o The state party blatantly ignored this regulation by continuing to hold white 
primaries in most parts of the state and continuing to administer the unfair voter 
registration tests. The MFDP also cited state violations of Title 18, Section 594 of the 
United States Code for using police arrest powers to intimidate blacks that wanted to 
vote.41 It was not unusual for those attempting to register to be forced into long lines at 
the courthouses. If they stepped out of line for any reason they could be arrested. In 
addition, the political debate centered on the Mississippi State Democratic Party's 
disloyalty to the National Democratic platfonn and ticket. Several state party members 
actually hoped to be thrown out of the convention. Many expressed contempt for the late 
John F. Kennedy , Lyndon Johnson, and the Democratic Party while supporting 
Republican opponent Barry Goldwater.42 Goldwater, a supporter of the use of nuclear 
weapons in Vietnam, opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Social Security, and federally 
mandated integration.43 He felt that an individual's right to discriminate and a state's 
right to segregate were integral parts of guaranteed liberty under the Constitution.44 Also, 
some of the State party's ideas were quite extreme. One of the proposed ideas was the 
mandatory teaching of Race and Reason in public high schools. This exposition of racist 
39 "Remarks of Mrs. Rita Schwemer," Bloom and Breines, pp. 44-45. 
4oBloom and Breines, p.34. 
41 SNCC Papers, 1959-1972 (U.M.l.) vol. 1. Letter from John Lewis to Congressman Jamie L Whitten. p.1. 
42 SNCC Papers, 1959-1972 (U.M.l.) vol. 2. Speech by John Lewis p.26. 
43 David Farber, The Age o/Great Dreams: America in the Sixties (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 
1994)pp.98, 101. 
44 Ibid p.101. 
13 
theories was viewed by many intransigent white supremacists as the authoritative work 
on race relations.45 Other ideas floated by the state party Democrats were the involuntary 
sterilization of the parents of illegitimate children and the passage of a vague criminal 
syndicalism statute that would be used to suppress Civil Rights groups.46 
Given the moral, legal, and political reasons the MFDP had for being seated, the 
members felt they were an attractive alternative to the all-white Mississippi delegation. 
Many, such as John Lewis, president of SNCC, felt the MFDP had a legitimate chance to 
be seated.47 Others, such as Fannie Lou Hamer, did not expect to be seated, but did 
expect something to be gained in Atlantic City.48 That something that Mrs. Hamer spoke 
of was not mere acknowledgement, but justice in the courts, inclusion in the democratic 
process, and acceptance of the phrase "all men are created equal." 
Despite the federal governments repeated failures to guarantee justice in 
Mississippi, the MFDP found it hard not to get their hopes up in Atlantic City. One 
reason for this was that they knew that they were right. Unita Blackwell, a member of 
SNCC's staff from Mississippi, "really thought [the MFDP] was going to get seated,,49 
because of the truth of the message they brought to the rest of the country. The hope that 
their knowledge of the truth brought them also hinged on the naIve belief that America 
would correct societal ills once confronted with them. Also, counsel for the MFDP, 
Joseph Rauh, seemed to think their chances of being seated were good. He felt a fight 
over the seating of the MFDP was won ifit reached the floor. 5o 
45 Ibid. p.22. 
46 Ibid. p.22. 
47 Interview with John Lewis, no date. Stoper, p. 234. 
48 Interview with Hamer, Stoper p.306. 
49 Mills, p 115. 
50 Ibid. p. 111. 
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To get to the floor, Rauh devised the "eleven and eight" strategy.51 For a vote on 
the seating of the MFDP to go to the convention floor, eleven of the one hundred and ten 
credentials committee delegates had to vote in favor of such a motion. Once the motion 
reached the floor, only eight states were needed to support the measure for a roll call vote 
to be ordered. Such a vote required each state publicly support either the MFDP or the 
segregated state delegation. Rauh believed northern states with large black populations 
would be hard-pressed to support segregationists. Also, Rauh cited a 1944 precedent of 
seating both parties when delegation seats were in dispute. 52 He knew if this compromise 
were offered, the regular delegation would walk out of the convention. Such a scenario 
would leave the MFDP as the lone representative of all Mississippi. 53 
Giving credibility to Rauh's optinlism was early support in the convention for the 
challengers from Mississippi. Before the convention, states such as New York and 
Michigan passed resolutions in support of the MFDP challenge. The ADA and Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. did the same. Even more encouraging was the fact that twenty-
five Democratic congressmen signed their names to a document which stated that 
"elementary justice" required that the MFDP be seated. 54 The truth of their message, the 
optimism of their counsel, and the initial support was enough to raise the hopes of even 
the most skeptical of MFDP delegates. 
To Lyndon Johnson, however, the MFDP's trip to Atlantic City was far from a 
moral crusade to benefit African-Americans. It was a trip that, if successful, would take 
African-Americans back to their status during Reconstruction by inciting political and 
51I bid. P 112 
52 In 1944, two delegations from Texas competed at the Democratic National Convention to be seated. 
President Roosevelt said to seat them both. Mills, p. 117. 
531bid. p. 117. 
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social backlash that could halt and even reverse the Civil Rights movement.55 Johnson 
feared the backlash might be severe enough to cost him the election, the support he 
needed in Congress for his agenda, or both. He felt that his agenda was crucial to the 
advancement of the African-American cause. Thus, he thought that seating the MFDP 
instead of the Mississippi delegation would harm and not help this cause. 
The election of 1964 came at a delicate time in American politics, and Johnson 
was keenly aware of the situation in which he found himself. He inherited the presidency 
after John F. Kennedy's assassination, and this left him in Kennedy's political shadow 
going into the election. He also inherited Kennedy's cabinet which was hostile at best 
towards Johnson. Johnson told Texas governor John Connally that this tension caused 
him considerable "agony.,,56 In addition to the political backlash Johnson received from 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act in June, there were pressures of the Cold War, 
Vietnam, and riots in American cities. 57 Even the traditionally Democratic South was 
beginning to look outside the party for answers to their concerns. The issues of race and 
desegregation had left the Democratic Party in an uneasy coalition between its northern 
and southern members. Southern states were still firmly entrenched in a segregated 
society, while their northern colleagues were pushing ahead with legislation and 
programs to bring the segregated way of life to an end. To have to take a public stand 
either way could be detrimental to what remained of party unity. Johnson felt the success 
of his agenda depended on pulling the country together and consolidating regional and 
racial support. To Johnson, the MFDP threatened to rip it apart. 
54 Dittmer, p. 286. 
55 Beschloss, p.526. LBJ conversation with Walter Reuther, president of the United AutoWorkers, on 
Monday, August 24, 1964. p.526. 
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During private Oval Office conversations, Johnson told Hubert Humphrey, John 
Connally, and Walter Jenkins that the South was the section of the country that worried 
him the most. 58 He was from the South, but the liberal politics he pursued tended to push 
the conservative Deep South away. The only thing he had to offer this part of the country 
was the campaign ticket of a Southern President and his choice for Vice-president, and 
even this had potential to alienate the South. 59 Carl Vinson,60 a respected Southern 
Democrat, warned Johnson that the South could not handle another civil rights advocate 
when he learned of the rumor that Hubert Humphrey might get the Vice-presidential bid. 
Johnson felt the South, especially his home state of Texas, should support him. Johnson 
told Walter Jenkins that the prospect of begging for the Southern vote seemed to him like 
begging on the street for a cup of coffee.61 The MFDP controversy, consequentially, 
threatened to put the South out of Johnson's reach. He feared that if the MFDP was 
recognized, the South and several border states would vote in favor of Goldwater. 
Johnson desired and needed the support of the South, and they were already threatening 
to abandon him and the party. He explained to Hubert Humphrey that he viewed the 
recognition of the MFDP as Goldwater's "blank check" for fifteen Southern and border 
states.62 Johnson acknowledged to James Rowe that he would lose Mississippi and 
probably a couple other deep South States, but he wanted to protect his support in 
southern states like Georgia and Texas as well as border states like Oklahoma and 
22Beschloss, p.470. LBJ's conversation with John Connally, Governor of Texas, on Thursday, July 23, 
1964. 
57 Ibid p.469. 
58 Beschloss, p.472. LBJ's conversation with Senate Majority Whip and vice-presidential hopeful Hubert 
Humphrey on Thursday, July 1964. 
59 Beschloss, p.470. LBJ's conversation with Connally on Thursday, July 23, 1964. 
60 Beschloss, p.517. Note: Carl Vinson was the House Armed Services Committee Chairman. 
61 Beschloss, p.531. LBJ's conversation with Walter Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President, on 
Thursday, August 25, 1964. 
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Kentucky.63 Finally, he needed the cooperation of the South's congressional Democrats 
who chaired numerous key committees vital to his Great Society legislation. Johnson's 
acknowledgement of the MFDP would alienate the South even farther and end hopes of 
cooperation between him and the congressmen who opposed him.64 
The MFDP also brought Johnson grief from the North. Many Northerners were 
appalled at the treatment of blacks in Mississippi, and states such as Ohio, New York, 
and Michigan had large African-American populations who would not tolerate their 
states supporting Mississippi.65 The Northen1 support for the MFDP, however, was far 
from unanimous. Johnson told Walter Reuther about the calls and letters he received in 
which he was reportedly "catching hell" from Northern constituents who felt that the 
"Negroes" had taken over the country and were running the White House and the 
Democratic Party.66 If the Mississippi delegation was to be unseated by the MFDP, the 
impression in the North and the South would be that "the niggers kicked them out. ,,67 
Johnson feared a mass ±light from the Democratic Party from across the country. He told 
Walter Reuther that he wanted congressmen elected who would protect the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 passed just two months earlier. A mass flight from the Democratic Party 
might have endangered the hard-fought bil1.68 It was clear that if the issue was brought to 
the Convention floor for a vote that Johnson would suffer political fall-out in the North, 
the South, and wherever the white population feared a "takeover" by African Americans. 
62 Beschloss, p.516. LBJ's conversation with Humphrey on Friday, August 14, 1964. 
63 Beschloss . p.4S5. LBJ's conversation with James Rowe on Thursday, July 30, 1964. 
64 Mills, p. 114. 
65 Beschloss, p.516. LBJ's conversation with Hubert Humphrey on Friday, August 14, 1964. 
66 Beschloss, p.527. LBJ's conversation with Reuther on Monday, August 24, 1964. 
67 Beschloss, p.469. LBJ's conversation with Connally on Thursday, July 23, 1964. 
68 Beschloss p.510. LBJ's conversation with Walter Reuther on Sunday, August 9, 1964. 
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The extent and severity of the expected backlash, however, was solely speculative. For 
Johnson, though, speculation was all he needed to justify his actions. 
While the foreseen political fall-out accounts for a great deal of Johnson's 
reluctance to support the MFDP, it cannot account for all of it. He also had some 
personal reservations and suspicions about the MFDP that helped justify his campaign 
against them. First of all, Johnson had been trying to get out of the shadow of his slain 
predecessor, but the late President's brother, Robert, always seemed to be breathing down 
Johnson's neck. Johnson was envious of Robert Kennedy's popularity and resentful of 
him being pushed as the Vice-presidential favorite. 69 He also knew that Kennedy did not 
like him, and Johnson always carried around a lingering suspicion of Kennedy. When the 
MFDP broke onto the scene, Johnson suspected Kennedy of starting the whole 
movement. 70 With no real evidence to support his suspicions, Johnson, during separate 
private conversations at the White House with Bill Moyers, Richard Russell, and Walter 
Jenkins, accused Kennedy of setting a trap with the MFDP to damage Johnson's chances 
of being elected.71 Johnson's suspicions were probably the result of Kennedy's known 
ambition to be president and Kennedy's dealings with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. To 
show just how misguided Johnson was in his suspicions, it is important to note that 
Martin Luther King, Jr. had nothing to do with MFDP challenge until it reached Atlantic 
City. Nevertheless, these suspicions greatly undermined the credibility of the MFDP in 
Johnson's mind. 
69 Beschloss, p.470. LBJ's conversation with Connally on Thursday, July 23, 1964. Johnson, commenting 
on reasons for not wanting Robert Kennedy for Vice-President, said he "didn't want to have to kiss the ass 
of a Vice President." p. 485. LBJ's conversation with Washington Attorney James Rowe on Thursday, July 
30, 1964. 
70 Beschloss, p.467. LBJ's conversation with John Connally on Thursday, July 23, 1964. 
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Another reason that Johnson was reluctant to support the MFDP was that he felt 
they were an extra-legal organization. He told Humphrey that there was "no justification 
for messing with the Freedom party at all" because they were "elected to nothing.,,72 
During the Convention, Johnson explained to Richard Russell that he felt that throwing 
out the "legally" elected delegates and the Governor of Mississippi would be the 
equivalent of depriving the state ofrepresentation.73 He doubted the origins of the MFDP 
and denied the legality of its challenge. Johnson was hard pressed, however, to deny the 
legality of the MFDP considering their conscious effort to meticulously follow the 
guidelines of Democratic Party, an effort that the state party had no intention of making. 
Discrediting Johnson's comments even further is the fact that he referred to the lily-white 
delegation as the "legally" elected delegates in spite of all of the rules they had broken to 
remain segregated. The establishment in Mississippi had denied blacks representation for 
years. Claiming that seating the MFDP would deny Mississippi legal representation 
highlights the bankruptcy of Johnson's position. He, nevertheless, convinced himself that 
he could not back the MFDP. 
Having denied the legitimacy of the MFDP, Johnson sent Vice-presidential 
hopeful Hubert Humphrey on a mission to secure the fate of the MFDP. The goal was to 
keep the seating controversy from coming to the floor of the Convention for a vote. 
Johnson knew the power of the MFDP's message, and feared a floor debate would be the 
catalyst for the backlash mentioned above. Early in the struggle, Humphrey made little 
71 Beschloss, pp.489, 525, & 532. LBJ's respective conversations with Press Secretary Bill Moyer, Friday, 
July 31, Richard Russell, Chainnan, Senate Anned Services Committee, Democrat of Georgia, Monday, 
August 24, and Jenkins, Tuesday, August 25, 1964 
72 Beschloss, pp.515-16. LBJ's conversation with Humphrey on Friday, August 14, 1964. 
73 Beschloss, p.523. LBJ's conversation with Reuther on Monday, August 24, 1964. Richard Russell had 
also advised Johnson that MFDP conventions were held in only eighteen or twenty out of eighty-two 
Mississippi counties. p. 524. LBJ's conversation with Russell on Monday, August 24, 1964. 
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headway with either the MFDP or the delegations of several Southern states. He 
suggested seating both groups, but Johnson would not consider it.74 In the President's 
opinion, the MFDP must not be seated. 
The actions President Johnson took to ensure the demise of the MFDP challenge 
were completely out of line with the principles on which his Great Society programs were 
supposedly based. In his memoirs, Johnson does not even mention the MFDP. His only 
reference to the 1964 convention paints the event as a "place of happy, surging crowds" 
where he was "warmed by the waves of applause.,,75 This, in fact, was not the case. He 
was obsessed with the MFDP and went to unbelievable lengths to eliminate the threat 
they represented. 
Long-time Johnson ally, Joseph Rauh, learned through experience what happened 
when someone did not bow to Johnson's wishes.76 The President had two big cards to 
play against Rauh and he played them well. First of all, he had Democratic powerhouse 
Walter Reuther, who put enormous pressure on Rauh. Reuther was the president of the 
wealthy United Auto Workers (UA W) union. Joseph Rauh's biggest client was the UA W, 
and, consequentially, Reuther had the authority to fire him. Johnson was "furious" about 
Rauh being the MFDP's counsel and he told Reuther to "tell that bastard god damn 
lawyer friend of yours that there ain't going to be all that eleven and eight shit at the 
74 Beschloss, p.515. In response to Humphrey's suggestion of seating both delegations Johnson said, "You 
can't do that at all. There's no compromise." LBI's conversation with Humphrey on Friday, August 14, 
1964. 
75 Lyndon Baines Johnson. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969. (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), p.l 01. 
76 Rauh was Johnson's counsel in the controversial Senate election of 1948. He helped Johnson win the 
legal fight against accusations and evidence that Johnson had stolen the election. Robert Mann. The Walls 
of Jericho: Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Russell, and the Struggle for Civil Rights. (New 
York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1996), p.lll. 
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convention.,,77 Reuther tried to get this point across to Rauh, and Rauh responded by 
instructing his boss to "tell [Johnson] that I'm an incorrigible son-of-a-bitch that you 
can't control.,,78 Needless to say, Johnson did not receive this message warmly. Rauh 
was also the chair of the ADA, and the UA W happened to be a large contributor to this 
organization. At one point in the struggle, Reuther threatened to pull all UA W money 
out of Mississippi if the MFDP persisted with their challenge?9 To all of the threats and 
pressures Reuther placed on Rauh, the general response he received was, "Walter, I just 
can't give up. I believe in this, Walter. After all, I'm an employee of the UA W, but I'm 
not operating that way here.,,8o Johnson's attempt to sway Rauh with his boss did not 
work. 
The second card that Johnson played against Rauh was the fact that Rauh and 
Hubert Humphrey were long-time friends and ADA allies. He used this to get to both of 
them at the same time. It was no secret that Johnson had hinged Humphrey's vice-
presidential hopes on whether or not the senator from Minnesota could defuse the 
situation with the MFDP. In Oval Office conversations Johnson repeatedly linked the 
possibility of nominating Humphrey to his stopping the MFDP. When talking to Walter 
Jenkins on the Friday before the convention, Johnson suggested Jenkins should call 
Humphrey and give him a not-so-subtle message. The message to Humphrey was "you 
better get Reuther and you better get Rauh to quit causing these goddamn troubles, 
Hubert, because this is going to make a bad convention if you don't tell them to quit 
doing stuff like this. Now if you haven't got any influence with this ADA crowd, tell us 
77 Mills, p. 112. 
78 Todd Gitlin. The Sixties: Years a/Hope, Days a/Rage. (New York: Bantum Books, 1987), p.154. 
79 McAdam, p. 120. 
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who has.,,81 Humphrey was aware of the pressure to find the solution the president 
wanted, but he never asked Rauh to give in to the administration's pressures.82 He would 
often ask Rauh for "something to tell the president," but he received the same brusque 
message that Walter Reuther received. 83 
Not only did Johnson go after Democratic insiders like Rauh and Humphrey to obtain 
his desired solution, but he also pursued the committee members who might vote 
opposite his position. To find out which members of the credentials committee supported 
the MFDP, Johnson exploited the naIvete of the MFDP by having a black congressman 
befriend the group while they were in Atlantic City. During a strategy session at the 
convention hall the congressman approached Bob Moses and asked for the list of 
committee members believed to be strongly behind the MFDP challenge. He said he 
wanted to show the list to the credential committee chair so that the strength of the 
MFDP's support would be known. Moses did not want to give up the list, but he did so 
at the urging of SNCC' s Courtland Cox. Cox, a leadership insider, remembers the 
subsequent events as "something unbelievable." He said "every person on that list. .. got 
a calL" A committee member was told that if she did not "shape up" her husband would 
not get the judgeship he was in line to receive. Others were told that the loans they were 
supposed to get would not come through.84 According to Joseph Rauh, the Secretary of 
the Army told a man who worked in the Canal Zone that his job would be lost ifhe did 
not withdraw his support from the MFDP.85 After the calls were made, numerous civil 
80 Oral History by Joseph Rauh. Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, eds. Voices of Freedom: An Oral History 
of the Civil Rights Movementfrom the 1950s through the 1980s. (New York: Bantum Books, 1990), p. 197. 
81 Beschloss, p.521. LBJ's conversation with Walter Jenkins on Friday, August 21, 1964. 
82 Mann, p.439. 
83 Oral History by Joseph Raub. Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, eds. p. 197. 
84 Ibid p. 199. 
85 McAdam, p. 120. 
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rights leaders, religious leaders, and liberals began to pressure the MFDP to moderate its 
position.86 
Johnson was not above doing some of the dirty work himself. His most blatant 
swipe at the MFDP came during Fannie Lou Hamer's testimony in front of the 
credentials committee. Johnson recognized the emotional power of Mrs. Hamer's 
testimony and called an impromptu news conference in the middle of her speech to get 
her off the air. The content of his news conference was of no substance. Courtland Cox 
remembers it being about the president's "trip to the hospital or some other foolishness-
his beagles, or something inconsequential. ,,87 This tactic was less successful than some 
of his others because the networks replayed Mrs. Hamer's testimony in full during prime 
time that evening. 88 
The most disturbing of President Johnson's tactics was, by far, his use of the 
FBI as his secret police force to find out information on the MFDP and other civil rights 
leaders in Atlantic City at the time. The historian John Dittmer has called the FBI 
operation in Atlantic City "a Watergate that worked.,,89 Johnson had about thirty agents 
keeping tabs on the MFDP for him in Atlantic City.9o The FBI bugged the MFDP's 
headquarters at the Gem Motel as well as Union Temple Baptist Church where the MFDP 
held its meetings.91 In addition to this, the rooms of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Bayard 
Rustin were also bugged. Even the supporters of the MFDP were put under 
86 Oral History by Courtland Cox. Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, eds. p. 199. 
87 Ibid p. 199. 
88 Mills, p. 123. 
89 W. Marvin Dutton. Ed. Essays on the American Civil Rights Movement. "The Transformation of the 
Mississippi Movement, 1964-68: The Rise and Fall ofthe Freedom Democratic Party." John Dittmer. 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993), p. 18. 
90 Kenneth O'Reilly. "Racial Matters": The FBI's Secret File on Black America} 1960-1972. (New York: 
The Free Press, 1989), p.186. 
91 Ibid p.187. 
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surveillance.92 Some agents even sported NBC press credentials and posed as reporters 
in order to find out strategy and support information.93 The FBI, who felt "it was a 
pleasure and a privilege to be of assistance to the president," provided Johnson with hour-
by-hour updates ofMFDP political strategy and the names of their supporters.94 The 
MFDP was treated like a bunch of spies. They were watched and followed and pressured 
to conform. They did not, but their supporters did. 
As the convention approached, the initial support the MFDP enjoyed began to 
deteriorate. The liberal Democrats who liked to champion the cause of civil rights began 
to withdraw their support for the challenge. As is the tendency in American politics, 
most began to move toward compromises being floated at the time. The first to be 
floated was from the Johnson camp, and it called for the MFDP to be admitted to the 
convention as "honored guests." The next proposal came from Oregon congressman and 
MFDP supporter Al Ullman, which called for giving the MFDP only two seats at the 
convention. Joseph Rauh recalls how his "heart sunk" at this suggestion because an 
MFDP supporter had reduced the demand to two votes "before the fight had started.,,95 A 
third compromise was from Oregon congresswoman Edith Greene. Her proposal, which 
appealed to the MFDP, called for the seating of anyone who would take a loyalty oath to 
the Democratic ticket. The final compromise, which was more or less an ultimatum, came 
from Lyndon Johnson. It allowed the MFDP only two at-large seats with symbolic votes, 
and the promise that the 1968 convention would be fully integrated. To add insult to 
injury, the two at-large delegates were chosen for the MFDP by the Democratic 
92 Ibid. p.l86. 
93 Ibid. p.187. 
94 Gitlin, p.l55. and Dittmer, p.292. 
95 Dittmer, p. 288. 
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leadership! With the MFDP leadership behind closed doors with top Democratic Party 
officials and powerful party members, such as Hubert Humphrey and Walter Reuther, Joe 
Rauh saw the MFDP's support evaporate as he tried to stave off the Johnson cronies from 
railroading the final compromise through the credentials committee. In the end, only 
eight people voted against the proposal. As Rauh put it, "They had gotten the rest of 
them away from US.,,96 Lyndon Johnson got his way. 
Initial reaction from the MFDP, which learned of the proposal's passage on 
television, was outrage. Bob Moses was in the meeting with Humphrey and Reuther 
when the news incorrectly reported unanimous passage of the proposal. Moses 
reportedly lost his temper and jumped up and yelled at Humphrey, "You tricked us." He 
then stormed out of the meeting and slammed the door.97 In front of the television 
cameras he voiced his distrust of the political system and vowed to no longer participate 
in it.98 The rest of the MFDP delegates reacted in similar fashion. They were infuriated. 
The misinformation about unanimous support for the Johnson proposal meant that Rauh 
would have had to vote for the proposal as well. He had met with Humphrey every night 
to try to bargain for the MFDP, and this close association left him suspect in the eyes of 
the MFDP.99 By the time the truth of the situation was clarified it was too late. A sense 
of betrayal had taken a firm grasp on the MFDP delegates. 
Exacerbating the tensions and increasing the anger felt by the MFDP delegates was 
the fact that Joseph Rauh and civil rights leaders from other organizations were pushing 
the MFDP to accept a proposal that was unacceptable. In front of the cameras, Rauh said 
96 Oral History by Joseph Rauh. Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, eds. p. 200. 
97 Dittmer, p.297. 
98 Oral History by Joseph Rauh. Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, eds. p. 202. 
99 Dittmer, p. 294. 
26 
that the proposal was "a great victory" because it included a promise that the Democratic 
Party would never again accept an all-white delegation. 100 The NAACP's Bayard Rustin 
called for the compromise because they were in "the world of politics, not protest," and 
compromise was a necessary part of this world. 101 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. seemed to 
understand that the proposal was inadequate, but he felt something could be gained by 
accepting it. He said that "as a Negro leader, I want you [MFDP] to take this, but if I 
were a Mississippi Negro, I would vote against it.,,102 The message of 'wait until next 
time' that the local authorities of Mississippi preached to African-Americans was now 
being delivered to the MFDP by national civil rights leaders, but to no avail. The MFDP 
rejected the proposal. The feelings of the MFDP delegates were summed up when 
Fannie Lou Hamer said, "we didn't come all this way for no two seats.,,103 
The MFDP returned home emotionally drained and disillusioned with the political 
process. All of the hopes and ideas the MFDP carried to Atlantic City were trampled on 
by the will of Lyndon Johnson. They put their lives on the line, only to have Democratic 
and national civil rights leaders try to push them in a direction other than the one toward 
justice. Now, as they returned to Mississippi, they faced continued harassment, 
discrimination, violence, and federal inactivity. 
A perfect example of the situation waiting at home for the MFDP ironically 
occurred on the night of August 24 as Lyndon Johnson accepted the Democratic 
nomination for President. As Johnson announced his plans for a Great Society, the home 
of COFO activists Matti and Willie Dillon of McComb shook with an explosion. In the 
100 Oral History by Joseph Rauh. Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, eds. p. 202. 
101 Mills, p. 129. 
102 Ibid p. 129. 
103 Dittmer, p. 302. 
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yard they found nine sticks of unexploded dynamite wrapped together in a paper bag. 
The local police and the FBI's task force in McComb investigated, but turned their focus 
to Mr. Dillon when they discovered he was working on a car owned by COFO. Mr. 
Dillon was arrested and charged with operating a garage without a license and for 
stealing electricity by attaching a wire outside the meter. He did not run a garage, and the 
illegal wire was used to power a floodlight he had installed to protect his family from the 
very attack he had undergone that evening. When the time came for Dillon's trial, it was 
bumped up thirty minutes without notifying his counsel, Jess Brown. When Mr. Brown 
arrived, Willie Dillon had already been convicted of the charges. He was fined $600 and 
sentenced to nine months in jail. His bond was set at $1,200, but it was changed to 
$2,000 when his family raised the previous amount. 104 No one was ever charged with the 
bombing, the twelfth in McComb since June 22. Shortly thereafter, the FBI reduced its 
force in McComb from fifteen to four agents. 105 President Johnson's Great Society was 
still a long way fronl Mississippi. 
Johnson could not understand why the MFDP would not go along with his wishes. 
When discussing the situation with Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the NAACP, 
Johnson said, "If I were the Negro ... I'd just let Mississippi sit up on the platform, if 
they wanted to, and I'd stand at attention and salute the son of a bitch. Then I'd nominate 
Johnson for President and my Vice President and I'd go out and elect my Congressman 
... And the next four years, I'd see the promised land.,,106 He never seemed to grasp the 
deep desires of the MFDP. He just wanted them to wait. By his actions he told African 
104 Ibid p. 303-4. 
105 Ibid p. 304. 
106 Beschloss, p.517. LBJ's conversation with Roy Wilkins on Saturday, August 15, 1964. 
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Americans to wait for justice, wait for inclusion in the democratic process, and to wait for 
equality. Johnson promised "the promised land" if they would only wait. 
President Johnson felt he, Humphrey, and the Democratic leadership had 
reached a good solution, but at what cost?107 He saw the compromise as 
epitomizing the Democratic Party by hearing "the poor, and the downtrodden. ,,108 
He heard them, but he did not listen. He, in fact, did everything possible to shut 
them up. For Johnson, the best way to help African Americans was for him to 
win a landslide election and keep the Denlocrats in firm control of Congress. He 
intended to change the plight of the African-American with political maneuvers, 
and his actions can be skewed as a means to further this end. Is it possible, 
though, to advance a cause when you ignore the every day plight of those you 
want to help? In order to end segregation in the Democratic Party, Johnson let a 
segregated delegation remain seated. In order to advance the cause of justice, 
Johnson used wire taps, FBI surveillance, and threats to deny the legitimacy of a 
legally tight challenge. All of this was to extend his hand to those who blatantly 
and openly broke the law. To further democracy, he did not allow the MFDP to 
vote. To promote equality, he refused to let "that illiterate woman [Fannie Lou 
Hamer] on the floor of the Democratic convention,,,109 and had white police 
officers remove the MFDP delegates from the convention floor on national 
television. 
The actions that Johnson took against the MFDP reveal volumes about his 
real priorities and about the extent of his power. The measures he employed to 
107 Beschloss, p.534. LBJ's conversation with Humphrey and Reuther on Tuesday, August 1964. 
108 Beschloss, p.534. LBJ's conversation with Humphrey and Reuther on Tuesday, August 25, 1964. 
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remain in firm control of the convention were unprecedented. He tried everything 
short of murder to neutralize his opponents and their supporters. The MFDP and 
its meager resources did not have a chance against the will of a leader in one of 
the world's most powerful institutions. His ability to have thirty FBI agents keep 
up with the movements of several civil rights and MFDP leaders shows that he 
did have power over the FBI. Why, then, did he not have them stop the violence 
occurring against civil rights workers in Mississippi instead of just taking notes? 
Atlantic City and the events surrounding it are a disturbing example of justice, 
democracy, and equality being traded for political expediency. Roy Wilkins 
remembers Atlantic City and the events that unfolded there with a "lasting sense 
of grievance" because of the "terrible damage to relations between white liberals 
and black organizers in the South." 11 0 
The bright spot in the controversy is the uncompromising determination of 
the MFDP. They showed that the poor and excluded can have a voice, and a loud 
one at that. They also den10nstrated that economic conditions do not have to 
determine one's political consciousness and activity. They embodied the ideals 
that America likes to think we possess. They risked their lives to confront 
societal and governmental wrongs, and they were not willing to sacrifice ideals 
and goals for token recognition. Their rejection of the compromise handed down 
from Johnson rejected the paternalism heaped on them from the government and 
other civil rights groups. It showed that they were competent to represent 
themselves, and that they would make their own decisions. The MFDP and its 
109 King, p. 347. 
110 O'Reilly, p.190. 
members embodied what America longs to be. The MFDP and its ideals were, 
nevertheless, rejected. When Lyndon Johnson betrayed the people that made up 
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